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Abstract: The Coase theorem is most often formulated in terms of bi-
lateral monopoly, for instance between a polluting factory and an affected 
neighbour.  Instead, we introduce multiple affected neighbours and the concept 
of anticommons, in which autonomous actors with separate yet necessarily 
complementary inputs each has the right to deny but not to permit use.  Once 
we posit multiple owners possessing complementary rights, strategically 
maximizing against each other as well as against the actor who wishes to 
purchase a portion of that right, the outcome is neither efficient nor invariant. 
Our finding, based on non-cooperative game theory, is sustained even under 
the restrictive Coase assumptions regarding complete information, perfect 
rationality, and zero transaction costs. The implication is that suboptimal 
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bundling agreements in cases of multiple stakeholders is not the mere product 
of market imperfection, but instead is a systematic result.
Keywords: Anticommons, bundling agreements, Coase theorem, complementary 
property rights, non-cooperative games, rational tragedies
1. Introduction
Contemporary property does not often fit comfortably into the classical ideal, 
from Blackstone, of sole and despotic dominion exercised with total exclusion to 
the rights of any other individual. Contemporary exchanges do not often fit the 
textbook economic image in which benefits and costs are all subsumed within 
the price and quantity agreed upon by buyer and seller, and in which the outcome 
from such transactions is entirely and invariably efficient. There is a growing 
literature regarding the necessity for bundling agreements among multiple relevant 
actors to a transaction and the probability that these lead to suboptimal outcomes. 
Nevertheless, the usual assumption, for instance in discussions of the so-called 
Tragedy of the Anticommons, is that bargaining inefficiencies would disappear 
under conditions of complete information, perfect rationality, and frictionless 
exchange. In this article, we argue that the assumption is incorrect. To make the 
argument, we need to reconsider the celebrated Coase theorem and the logic upon 
which it is based.
Ronald Coase began his celebrated paper on “The Problem of Social Cost” 
(1960) with the example of a negative externality in which a factory emits 
polluting smoke with “harmful effects on others”. His important observation was 
that the relationship is reciprocal, for any beneficial reduction in smoke emission 
equally entails harms to the factory. Interestingly, Coase immediately shifts from 
the plural to the singular. In the second paragraph of the paper, he formulates the 
problem as between two actors, A and B. Subsequent examples (e.g. between the 
farmer and the cattle rancher, or between the confectioner and the neighbouring 
doctor) continue the re-formulation in which the ostensible ‘offending principal’ 
and the ostensible ‘subjected victim’ are each cast as unified actors. No longer are 
the effects spread among multiple others. 
This paper seeks to demonstrate that the Coase theorem falters when applied 
in the plural rather than the singular. The motivating insight is that the two-sided 
externalities game as a bi-lateral monopoly, with one polluter and one victim, 
is dissimilar in structure and outcome to the multi-sided game in which the 
n≥2 victims rationally play against each other as well as against the polluter. 
Our approach is quite different from those focused on transaction costs, which 
conclude that the complications from constructing and enforcing contractual 
agreements become magnified as the number of actors grows. It is also different 
from those emphasising the problems arising from strategic holdout, which 
increases the time and effort of negotiation (Cohen 1991) or which distorts 
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outcomes as a consequence of dissimulation, bluffs, asymmetric capacities, or 
withheld information (Cooter 1982).
Instead, we preserve all the assumptions of the Coase ideal-world model, 
altering only the number of relevant parties. We introduce into the discussion 
the concept of anticommons, where two or more separate individuals have 
conjoint property rights over a shared good (Heller 1998). None of the owners 
of the right can by herself use or allow use of this good. Each has the ability to 
refuse or restrict use by others. Solution is found through the analytic tools of 
non-cooperative game theory; the Nash equilibrium result proves to be neither 
efficient nor invariant. The Coase theorem asserts that the costless calculations 
of rational maximisers will lead them freely to the optimal final allocation of 
resources regardless of the initial assignment of rights among them. Our reply 
is that such costless calculations do not lead to optimal allocation in cases of 
anticommons, where bi-lateral monopoly does not prevail. Moreover, bi-lateral 
monopoly is a rare occurrence; externalities most often affect several actors 
simultaneously.
The implication is quite sweeping. It should no longer be assumed that 
bundling suboptimality is a mere function of market imperfection, and that free 
and voluntary negotiation among the actors should automatically be the preferred 
social policy, in some ideal ‘Coasean’ world or in this world to the extent that a 
given situation approaches, as closely as possible, ideal market conditions. Instead, 
bundling suboptimality emerges as a systematic result, even under frictionless 
conditions, whenever the multiple separate holders of a property right must 
establish agreement among themselves as well as with the actor generating the 
externality. There is thus no logical predisposition either for or against privately 
negotiated solutions.
The paper proceeds in five sections. The first, for the sake of background, 
briefly describes the problem of social cost as a bi-lateral monopoly, establishing 
the Coase conclusion and identifying its inherent assumptions. The second 
and third shift away from bi-lateral monopoly, presenting and developing the 
logic of anticommons as a rational tragedy resulting systematically in Pareto 
suboptimality. The fourth applies anticommons to the problem of social cost, 
generating within the same restrictive assumptions quite different results than 
those advanced through the Coase theorem. The brief conclusion contrasts the 
approach adopted here with associated discussions in the literature, exploring the 
implications inherent to situations of multiple-actor strategic bargaining.
2. The Coase theorem as bi-lateral monopoly
Imagine that neighbour N lives next door to a factory that generates noxious 
smoke as a by-product of its normal industrial activity. The more production, the 
more smoke the factory generates. N wins from the court the right to live without 
the offending smoke. The factory cannot produce unless it obtains from N part of 
this right, for which it is willing to pay. The higher the per-unit price for pollution 
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permits, the lower the quantity of permits the factory will purchase and thus the 
lower the level of production it will achieve. We assume that there is a one-to-one 
fixed relationship between the quantity of pollution permits purchased and the 
quantity of production from the factory upon purchasing those permits. Under 
the ideal conditions of the Coase theorem, the factory’s marginal cost function is 
MC(Q)=c+P, where c is the (constant) marginal cost of production and P is the 
price paid per unit of pollution permit.
N understands the factory’s demand for a portion of her right and, although sale 
is completely at her discretion, she recognises that there are available combinations 
of price and quantity that represent a utility gain over the no-pollution, no-payment 
status quo. Given her monopolistic control over the decision to sell, N’s rational 
strategy is to set a per-unit price such that the quantity of permits purchased by the 
factory yields a maximising return. 
The factory confronts the neighbour N with a simple demand function for 
pollution permits:
 
1 ( ).Q P c= − +
 
(1)
The neighbour has a constant valuation v for a clean environment, and thus the 
sale of Q units of pollution permit entails a loss of vQ=v(1−(P+c)). The neighbour 
finds the price of pollution permits by maximising her net benefit:
 
max{(1 ( )) (1 ( ))}.
P
P c P v P c− + − − +
 (2)
The first order condition of her benefit maximisation is:
 
1 2 0.P c v− − + =  (3)
Solving (3) for P, the maximising price per unit of pollution permit is:
 
1
.
2
c vP − +=  (4)
Inserting this into (1), the quantity of pollution/production units purchased by 
the factory becomes:
 
1
.
2
c vQ − −=  (5)
Conversely, when the factory has the entire property right, it faces the 
neighbour’s demand for unpolluted air, which it will accept to the degree that it 
receives compensation greater than the value of lost production. The neighbour, 
in essence, is purchasing some share of the pollution right from the factory, which 
it will then leave unused. The lower the unit-price, the greater the quantity of the 
factory’s pollution right the neighbour will buy. Thus the neighbour’s demand for 
buying a lower-pollution environment from the factory is:
 
1 ( ).Q P v= − −
 (6)
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The factory rationally maximises its net benefit
 
max{(1 ( )) ( )}.
P
P v P c P v− − − −
 (7)
The first order condition of the firm’s profit maximisation is:
 
1 2 0.P v c− + − =  (8)
Solving (8), we have:
 
1
.
2
c vP − +=  (9)
Neighbour N therefore purchases pollution reduction at the maximising quantity:
 
1
.
2
c vQ − −=  (10)
As anticipated for any such example of pollution externality with bi-lateral 
monopoly, the Coase theorem is clearly sustained. Equation (4) is identical to 
equation (9); equation (5) is identical to equation (11). The result is efficient 
and invariant regardless whether the neighbour or the factory is awarded the 
initial property right. Our argument, however, is that the Coase theorem can be 
sustained only on the limiting condition of bi-lateral monopoly. The outcome 
will be different upon the addition of multiple victims of a polluting factory and 
introduction of the tragic rational logic of anticommons.
For ease of presentation, we will henceforth assume that the marginal cost of 
production c and the neighbour’s valuation v = 0. The assumption is artificial but 
it does not affect the result we wish to emphasise. Thus, in lieu of (4) and (5), the 
first-order condition of the neighbour’s benefit maximisation becomes:
 p1 2 0 1 / 2; 1 / 2; 1 / 4NP P Q− = ⇒ = = =  (11)
where pN denotes the neighbour’s net benefit from selling pollution permits to the 
factory. In lieu of (9) and (10), the first-order condition of the factory’s benefit 
maximisation is:
 
p− = ⇒ = = =1 2 0 1 / 2; 1 / 2; 1 / 4FP P Q  (12)
where pF denotes the factory’s net benefit from selling pollution reduction to the 
neighbour.
As with all formal models, the Coase argument relies upon a number 
of critical assumptions. George Stigler, who claims to have christened the 
proposition (1988, 77), asserts that the Coase theorem prevails under conditions 
of perfect competition (1966, 113). The claim seems somewhat odd, for the Coase 
examples all are formulated as two-party non-cooperative games of negotiation 
(Regan 1972; Schweizer 1988). The precondition emphasised by Coase was zero 
transaction cost, regardless of the number of parties involved. A complicated 
concept (Rose 1997; Fennell 2013), his formulation was that, for a successful 
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market transaction, “it is necessary to discover who it is that one wishes to deal 
with, to inform people that one wishes to deal and on what terms, to conduct 
negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up the contract, to undertake the 
inspection needed to make sure that the terms of the contract are being observed, 
and so on” (1960, 15). The Coase theorem also assumes well-defined property 
rights and complete rationality for all the players, entailing that none would accept 
a lower payoff when a higher one is available as a consequence of unilateral 
action. Finally, the theorem entails exacting conditions about information. The 
relevant parties must have common knowledge that they are involved in a non-
cooperative game with the potential to generate maximising payoffs. Similarly, 
they must have common knowledge regarding the main details of the game 
structure, including all demand and cost functions and the range of available 
payoffs to the various actors. Each player understands and chooses her benefit 
maximising position, and all other players know this and make their choices 
based on this knowledge. Therefore the players have no ability to maintain 
private information from their bargaining counterparts and thus no ability to 
disguise and deceive in the attempt to receive a bargaining advantage (Farrell 
1987; Hahnel and Sheeran 2009).
The main issue is how to address strategic decisions and actions. The Coase 
model posits that all actors similarly have self-interest in securing returns equal 
to, if not greater than their reservation prices. It assumes that the process of 
calculating those returns and mutually discovering the equilibrium outcome is 
costless, imposing no deadweight loss and no distortion upon the negotiated logical 
conclusion. This cannot be interpreted to mean, however, that “strategic costs” 
must exist whenever an equilibrium outcome differs from Pareto efficiency, for 
that would transform the Coase theorem into a mere tautology impervious to any 
further discussion. Equally, it cannot be interpreted as ruling out all movements 
of calculated rational behaviour, for that would also deny the bids and responses 
essential within Coasean logic for rectifying any initial misallocation of resources. 
The object is to distinguish process from outcome, and to imagine a realm in 
which the strategic process is fully effortless, frictionless, and painless. The 
outcome, whether Pareto efficient or not, is then deduced from the combination of 
decisions within that costless realm.
Ronald Coase was adamant that the ideal and imaginary conditions inherent 
to the theorem that bears his name are not meant to be a representation of 
economic reality, but instead should serve merely as a baseline intended to 
prompt study of the actual world in which transaction costs are non-zero (1988; 
1991). One can imagine challenges ‘external’ to the Coase theorem that target 
the situations where the theorem allegedly applies. Equally, one can imagine 
challenges ‘internal’ to the theorem, focused on the reasoning contained 
within. Our argument is of the latter sort. Thus we will maintain the stringent 
assumptions of the Coase model and not seek to adjust them to the real world of 
political-economic relationships. 
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3. On the anticommons tragedy
According to Michael Heller, who has been most responsible for developing and 
popularising the concept, anticommons is defined “as a property regime in which 
multiple owners hold effective rights of exclusion in a scarce resource” (1998, 
668). The key premise is that the resource cannot be put to use without a bundling 
of approvals from the various separate owners. Yet bundling cannot be achieved 
apart from the rational maximising behaviours of the separate stakeholders, 
resulting systematically in inefficient under-utilisation. 
Tragedy of the anticommons is contrasted against the more familiar tragedy 
of the commons. In the tragedy of the commons, each of the multiple owners of a 
collective property has unconstrained privileges of use without an effective way to 
limit the use privileges of others. By contrast, in the tragedy of the anticommons, 
each of the multiple owners of the collective property has unlimited rights of 
exclusion over the use privileges of others without the means to personally insure 
use privileges for herself or her designated agents.
In anticommons, each of the co-owners thus has the unconstrained ability 
to block or restrict supply of their joint property, whether directly through 
prohibitions and conditions upon the quantity made available or indirectly 
through the price charged for use or sale. Nevertheless, none of them can control 
the value generated by the property, for that is a consequence of the sum of all 
their individual decisions. At the core of anticommons problem, therefore, is the 
need to assemble separate permissions, all of which are necessary to enable usage. 
Each of the autonomous owners individually bears her own costs from granting 
use permission. Each owner is fully entitled to set her own limits upon permission, 
independent of all others. Only as a collective bundle, however, do these 
permissions allow the property to function effectively; only as the consequence of 
bundled agreements will the property generate some level of return to be allocated 
among the autonomous property owners.
The complication is that the benefits from successful bundling sit as a positive 
externality resulting from the permissions given. Each owner can realise only a 
portion of the anticipated gain and need not place any value on the portion secured 
by others. There is thus incentive for playing a strategic game over the distribution 
of rewards. The ultimate power for each player is her individual right to veto any 
proposed utilisation of the collective property. Yet such action denies benefits 
to everyone, including the player imposing the veto. Anticommons thus poses 
interconnected problems of permission-assembly and reward-allocation which 
must be solved jointly in order for the property to be productively employed. 
The impending tragedy is caused by the fact that, when the players do not fully 
internalise the penalties imposed from strategically enforcing their rights to exclude, 
potential value will remain unrealised. The combination of their separate Nash 
maximising behaviours causes returns to be lower, both in the aggregate and also 
for the players individually. Importantly, tragedy prevails even under conditions of 
rational understanding, perfect information, and zero transaction cost.
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For instance, a soccer team is comprised of individual players who anticipate 
improved chances of winning if they successfully coordinate together. Yet each 
also suspects that full coordination might mean some reduction in his own 
measured statistics, which will affect fame, lucrative endorsements, and the size of 
any future contract. And each knows that all the other players calculate similarly. 
Absent intervention, the separate yet maximising players will achieve some high 
level of athletic coordination but, according to anticommons logic, it will occur to 
a lower degree than optimal, resulting in somewhat fewer team wins. This logic 
has found empirical support from controlled laboratory experiments (Stewart 
and Bjornstad 2002; Vanneste et al. 2006; Depoorter and Vanneste 2006). It has 
also provided explanation for a number of practical illustrations of the inefficient 
bundling of property use permissions (Heller and Eisenberg 1998; Shapiro 2001; 
Ziedonis 2004; Maurer 2006; Park 2010 – yet in opposition see Walsh et al. 2003; 
Hansen et al. 2006). Our focus in this paper is more analytic. The claim is that 
the anticommons model has theoretic implications far deeper than customarily 
posited and that the anticommons tragedy is thus more intrinsic that ordinarily 
imagined.
The formal model was developed initially by Buchanan and Yoon (2000) and 
advanced subsequently (Schulz et al. 2002; Parisi et al. 2004; Parisi et al. 2005). 
Imagine, for instance, a private garage with two (or more) separate owners where 
individuals who wish to park their cars must purchase a permit from each owner 
and where both permits are absolutely necessary. Or imagine two or more separate 
owner-residents of a building, each of whom must give consent regarding the 
request from a medical facility to rent the ground floor. More realistically, imagine 
multiple separate patent holders with licencing rights over component processes 
necessary for the development of a new pharmaceutical product. Or multiple 
separate musicians with copyrights over songs needed for a movie soundtrack. 
It could also be multiple bureaucracies each with the power to approve or refuse 
approval for land development or a public works project (Marian 2013). It could 
be multiple countries separately deciding upon the extent and conditions for the 
financial bailout of another (Major 2014). The core prerequisites are merely that 
each actor knows that there are several necessary complementary inputs, that 
she controls at least one of them, and that successful bundling of all inputs will 
generate positive benefits available for allocation, giving rise to a non-cooperative 
strategic game.
For analysis, we return to the above example of the polluting factory but 
with one major change. Assume now that there are multiple separate residential 
neighbours who collectively were affected by the factory’s smoke emission but 
since have been awarded the legal right to live pollution free. Again, they can 
foresee a net utility gain from tolerating some degree of factory production, which 
will occur on the condition that each is compensated by an appropriate side-
payment. The factory cannot produce unless the neighbours sell some quantity of 
pollution permits; the neighbours all understand that each will receive a potential 
utility gain only if they all contract with the factory. By function of the collective 
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property right, no single neighbour or subgroup of neighbours can contract 
effectively with the factory, as that would inflict unwanted, uncompensated, and 
thus unjustified pollution on the other neighbours. In the anticommons model, 
each actor has the capacity to prevent joint action but not to initiate action by 
herself.
The N=1,…,n separate neighbours autonomously seek to maximise their 
individual benefit, charging a price in exchange for their consent to pollution, 
with recognition that the others are doing similarly in a venture that requires 
bundled consent. Each neighbour individually sets a price pi (i=1,…, n), yet the 
net level of permissible polluting output from the industry depends on the sum of 
the individual prices charged. (For ease of presentation, we are have constructed 
the story with strict complementarity of inputs, with no available substitutions.)
The higher the sum price per unit, the lower the quantity of pollution rights that 
the factory will purchase and thus the lower the level of its resulting production. 
For the neighbours collectively, there is an optimising price-quantity combination. 
Importantly, they will not rationally achieve it. We assume that the polluter has 
a linear demand curve for pollution permits: 
1
1 .n iiQ P== −∑  We further assume 
that the neighbours do not incur any variable costs associated with their consent.
Cournot-Nash solutions entail that the “best response” for any player exists 
when she selects the strategy that yields a maximising payoff given the strategies 
selected by the other players.
 
1 1
max max 1 .
i i
n n
i j i j ip pj j
p p p p p
= =
       
− ⋅ = − ⋅           ∑ ∑  (13)
Applied to the anticommons problem, each neighbour will adopt her price 
from the first-order condition of rent maximisation in which the first derivative of 
her payoff by her price, contingent upon the prices charged by the other players, is 
set at zero since she wishes it to be invariant regardless of what the other players 
choose to do. The first order conditions are:
 
1
1 0 , .
n
i j
j
p p i j
=
− − = ∀∑  (14)
Given zero marginal cost for all the players, the rent maximising price will 
also be the same for all of them. From the first order conditions, it follows that:
 
1
1 1
;  ;  
1 1 1
n
i i
i
nP P Q
n n n
=
= = =
+ + +
∑
 
(15)
Each neighbour’s return is thus:
 
p 2
1( ) ( 1)i iP n= +  (16)
and the total return for n separate neighbours is:
 
p =
+ 2
.( 1)C
n
n
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Comparing these results to those in equation (11), the implication is that, with 
multiple separate neighbours, the sum price per unit charged to the factory 
for pollution permits is higher than had there been one single neighbour or 
had they acted as a unified cartel. The quantity of permits purchased by the 
factory is thus lower, as is the net return to the neighbours. The only change 
in the situation is the move from one affected actor with the property right 
to two or more separate actors, each enforcing her maximising price given 
that permissions from all must necessarily be bundled in order for the return 
to be realised. Moreover, the gap between the anticommons outcome and the 
bi-lateral monopoly outcome increases with the number of separately entitled 
neighbours. Anticommons is equilibrium at rational tragedy. Despite the fact 
that all the players can see a preferable result, none can achieve it by unilateral 
action alone. The Nash solution will always be Pareto inferior.
As an aside, if we alter the situation so that any of the N individual neighbours 
can effectively sell pollution permits to the factory, rather than all of them 
separately but unanimously having to agree to sell, the result instead is a tragedy 
of the commons (Buchanan and Yoon 2000). Opposite to the anticommons, each 
neighbour then has the right to use (or to grant usage) but not to exclude. The 
main difference in the strategic situation is that the factory is now purchasing 
supplementary approvals from the neighbours rather than complementary 
approvals. The outcome is reciprocal to the anticommons, 
1
1
1
n
ii
P
n=
=
+
∑  and 
,
1
nQ
n
=
+
 yet the extent of inefficiency is identical, p 2 1 / 4( 1)C
n
n
= <
+
 when 
n is >1.
As a further aside, we could also alter the situation so that there is only one 
neighbour but F polluting factories, although this is very unlikely to occur in 
practise. If the neighbour has the property right, each factory individually will seek 
to purchase pollution permission for itself so that it can produce at some desired 
level. If the factories have the property right, the neighbour can negotiate with all 
or some of them on an individual basis. As there are no conjoint effects, the result 
is competition. The more property owners, the more the outcome approaches pure 
competitive optimality, whereas under anticommons, the more property owners, 
the more the outcome moves away from optimality. The situation becomes 
anticommons only if the neighbour by stipulation must purchase pollution 
reduction from all of the F factories together. Then they would each possess a 
necessary yet complementary input, such that any one of them could prevent sale 
but none could implement sale by itself.
4. Developments on the anticommons logic
We can expand the basic anticommons model in a number of ways. Assume that 
there is a dominant owner of the property right who decides about her own price 
first, and that the other owners can observe and adjust their price accordingly. We 
shall call the first mover the “leader” – who sets her price p1 – and we label the 
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other n–1 property owners as “followers” in this game. We retain the previous 
demand function and the assumption about zero variable (and marginal) cost. The 
first order conditions now become:
 
1 1
1 1 1
1 1
1
1 2 0;
1 ( 1) 0.
j
j
j j
j i
j
dp
p p p
dp
p n p p
≠ ≠
≠
≠
− − − =
− − − − =
∑ ∑
∑
 
(17)
Because of the followers’ symmetric conditions, we have:
 
1 1
1 1
  and  .
2 2j
p p
n
≠= =  (18)
The total price and quantity demanded become:
 1
1
2 1 1
; .
2 2jj
np p p Q
n n≠
−
= + = =∑  (19)
The neighbours’ joint net benefit will be: 2
2 1
.
4
n
n
−
 As can be easily seen from 
comparing equations (15) and (19), the total price will be even higher, and the 
quantity demanded and the neighbours’ total net benefit will be even lower, than 
under the neighbours’ simultaneous decisions. 
Even further, we introduce the complication of differentiated upstream and 
downstream actors and thus the calculation of double marginalisation. The step 
is useful in order to demonstrate that the anticommons tragedy reduces social 
wealth rather than merely redistributes it. We start with the simple example of 
one biotechnology innovator with a patent right and one drug manufacturer who 
buys the patent in order to produce a new pharmaceutical that it sells on the retail 
market. Then we will add the anticommons situation of multiple biotechnology 
innovators whose patents all need to be bundled in order for the manufacturer to 
have a product capable of retail sale. 
It is an important and well-established result that, when an “upstream” and 
a “downstream” monopoly engage in a market transaction, the welfare reducing 
effect of the two monopolies generates a larger deadweight loss than had the two 
companies merged into a single unit. The price set by the upstream monopoly 
affects the costs incurred by the downstream monopoly and thus the demand the 
downstream actor encounters when selling the product to consumers. Reciprocally, 
the total revenue to the downstream monopoly affects the amount of rent available 
for allocation and thus the price/quantity calculation by the upstream monopoly. 
One might expect that, given several relevant upstream market actors, their 
competition would temper the negative effects of double marginalisation. We 
show below that just the opposite occurs if the upstream actors’ complementary 
inputs must be bundled for use by the downstream actor; the welfare-reducing 
effect from double marginalisation actually will be exacerbated.
First, assume that the drug manufacturer faces consumer demand Q=1–R, 
where R is the market price. Assume further, for the sake of simplicity, that 
Anticommons, the Coase Theorem and the problem of bundling inefficiency 255
the manufacturer does not face costs other than what it pays to the upstream 
biotechnology innovator. The innovator charges a royalty fee of W for each 
unit the manufacturer sells and incurs a constant unit cost of production. The 
manufacturer maximises its profit, p(R,W), by solving:
 
p( , ) (1 )( ) 1 2 0,R W R R W R W
R R
∂ ∂ − −
= = − + =∂ ∂  (20)
from which we have:
 
1 1
; .
2 2
W WR Q+ −= =  (21)
The innovator, in turn, finds his profit-maximising price by solving:
 
1 ( )
2( ) 1 2 0,
2
Wd W c
d W W c
dW dW
 − 
−   P − + 
= = =
 (22)
where P(W) is the innovator’s profit and c is his (constant) marginal cost. We 
disregard for simplicity the fixed costs of R & D in component development. By 
deduction:
 
1
.
2
cW +=  (23)
Plugging the result from (23) back into equation (21) we get:
 
p
p
2
2 2
3 1 1
; ; ( , ) ;
4 4 4
(1 ) 3(1 )( ) ;
8 16
c c cR Q R W
c cW
+ − − 
= = =   
− −P = +P =
 (24)
By contrast, had the two actors merged, the new company’s profit would be 
T(R)=(1–R)(R–c), where P
m
(R) stands for the merged firm’s total profit. Its profit 
maximising price and quantity would be 1 1; ,
2 2
c cR Q+ −= =  and it would 
earn profits 
2(1 )( ) .
4
cR −Τ =  As can be seen by comparing these results to those 
in equation (24), the merged firm would charge a lower price and sell a larger 
quantity to customers, and it would earn a larger return.
Now we introduce anticommons, maintaining the same framework except that 
the manufacturer now must bundle n different patented components to produce 
the marketable drug, and those components are owned separately by n different 
biotechnology innovators each with a patent right. As before, we assume that 
the drug manufacturer does not incur costs other than paying a royalty fee to 
each patent holder for each unit of the drug sold. We denote these royalty fees 
as W1,W2, …, Wn. The manufacturer charges to consumers retail price R for each 
unit. Patent holders incur a unit cost (constant marginal cost) of producing the 
components for the drugs c1, c2, …, cn, respectively.
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Again, the consumers’ market demand function for the drug is Q=1−R. The 
manufacturer maximises its profit:
 ( )p
=
   
= − −     ∑1 1max ,  ,  ...,  max (1 ) .
n
n i
R R
i
R W W R R W
 
(25)
The first order condition for profit maximum is:
 
p
=
= − + =∑
1
( ) 1 2 0.
n
i
i
d R
R W
dR
 (26)
Solving (26) for R we have:
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Patent holders also maximise their profits:
 
=
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where Pi denotes profits of patent holder and ci is the unit cost of patent holder i. 
The first order conditions are:
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Solving the first order conditions obtains:
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Using the results from (30):
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The manufacturer’s profit will be:
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 
−  
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while the patent-holders together earn the following profit:
 
= =
   
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Total profit in the retail and the patent market becomes:
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Above we had shown that the anticommons situation, with two or more owners 
of complementary inputs calculating separately, generates a Pareto suboptimal 
outcome compared to a situation in which the same inputs are owned by a single 
actor or a unified cartel of actors. We also had shown that double-marginalisation 
with autonomous firms, one that controls a necessary upstream input and one that 
retails the product from that input downstream, generates a Pareto suboptimal 
outcome compared to a situation in which the two firms merge. Now we have 
put the two elements together. As can be seen from equations (31) through (34), 
when we posit separate profit-maximisers and multiple complementary inputs 
that necessarily must be bundled for the creation a product that is then sold to 
consumers, the retail price (R) is higher, the total quantity sold (Q) is lower, and 
total profits are lower relative both to the case of a fully merged firm and to that 
of dual monopolies. 
The anticommons model is quite plausible. Contrary to the customary story of 
external effects, it is rare that one would find a pharmaceutical manufacturer that 
requires only one necessary patent licence or an industrial polluter with just one 
affected neighbour. The introduction of two or more separate maximising actors 
controlling a set of rights that must be purchased changes the outcome significantly. 
Even when they are all rational and fully informed, and when their agreements 
can be bundled without cost or delay, the product of their strategic calculations 
results in systematic inefficiency. Moreover, the maximising pharmaceutical 
manufacturer or industrial polluter, similarly rational and knowledgeable, will 
incorporate these costs into its calculations. The consequence is lower returns 
to the multiple rights-holders and to the producer who bundles those rights, and 
higher prices to consumers compared to an alternative, unified property regime.
5. Anticommons and the limitations of the Coase theorem
All that remains is to connect our discussion of the anticommons tragedy with 
that of the Coase theorem in order to evaluate its claim that, under conditions of 
frictionless exchange, the outcome from voluntarily negotiated agreement will 
be both efficient and invariant regardless of who holds the property right. For 
ease of presentation, we return to the simplest version of anticommons model, as 
found above in Section II. Evaluation of the Coase assertion of efficiency entails 
comparison of the anticommons situation, entailing multiple separate neighbours 
and one polluting factory, to that of bi-lateral monopoly, maintaining in both cases 
that the neighbour(s) has the property right to live pollution free. Evaluation of 
the Coase assertion of invariance entails comparison of the anticommons situation 
where the neighbours have the property right to the corresponding situation where 
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instead the factory has the property right. Throughout, we retain the ideal-world 
assumptions of full rationality, complete information, and zero transaction costs.
As seen in equations (15) and (16), the rational Nash strategic play for each 
of the separate benefit-maximising neighbours when they collectively possess the 
property right is to set her price for pollution permits at 1 ,
1i
P
n
=
+
 generating a 
sum price of 
1
.
1
n
ii
nP
n=
=
+
∑  The factory will respond by purchasing 1 1Q n= +
units of permit, resulting in a total return to the n neighbours of p 2 .( 1)C
n
n
=
+  
The factory will most likely protest, reminding the separate neighbours that there 
is a higher total return available had they acted as a unified cartel and set the 
sum price at ½ (from equation 11). Yet the factory, because it does not control 
the property right, cannot impose this alternative outcome and the n neighbours, 
deciding separately and lacking the ability to force cooperation, will not discover 
it. Any unilateral yet altruistic pre-commitment from neighbour i to charge a price 
per production permit equal to her fair share of the ideal sum price, 
1
,
2i
P
n
=
 
would result ultimately in an inferior personal return than had she charged the 
Nash-calculated price.
Critique of the efficiency claim follows straightforwardly, comparing the 
anticommons result with the bi-lateral monopoly result. The anticommons price 
will always be higher and the quantity of pollution rights purchased will always 
be lower. Moreover, the net anticommons return will always be lower than the bi-
lateral monopoly return, 2 1 / 4,( 1)
n
n
<
+
 whenever n is >1.
Pareto efficiency exists at the allocation of resources in which it is impossible 
to make anyone better off without making at least one individual worse off; 
strategic equilibrium exists at the allocation of resources in which it is impossible 
for any individual to improve her position through unilateral action alone. By 
deduction, there is space for rational tragedy to occur in the gap left between 
the two definitions. The anticommons result is thus identified as equilibrium at a 
systematically suboptimal allocation. Hypothetically, there might have been only 
one neighbour. Hypothetically, a court might have assigned the initial property 
right to live pollution-free to the n neighbours as a unified whole, mandating 
that they form a cartel for purposes of effective bargaining. Hypothetically, the 
n neighbours might have constructed by voluntary pre-commitment a decision-
making scheme to link them together (Ostrom 1990). Our point is that alternative 
property regimes and institutional arrangements have entailed consequences for 
the problem of social cost, affecting the realisation of market efficiency.
For critique of the invariance claim, we compare the anticommons outcome to 
that achieved under identical conditions, with the sole exception that the property 
right is instead assigned to the single polluting factory. The n separate neighbours 
must now successfully compensate the factory for pollution reduction. We assume, 
for simplicity, that the neighbours have identical valuations.
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From the perspective of the single factory, little changes relative to the 
situation of bi-lateral monopoly. The higher the sum per-unit price, the lower the 
quantity of pollution rights the neighbours will purchase away from the factory, 
1
1 .n ii P Q= = −∑  Equivalent to (12) above, the first-order condition of the factory’s 
benefit maximisation is: 
 
= =
− = ⇒ =∑ ∑
1 1
1 2 0 1 / 2
n n
i i
i i
P P
 (35)
If so, the quantity of pollution reduction purchased by the n neighbours would 
again be Q = ½ and the factory’s return will be pF = ¼.
However, from the perspective of the neighbours, the quantity of pollution 
reduction is a public good. Each Ni does not value the utility of Q accruing to the 
others; whatever the sum P, each Ni has a rational interest in free riding, shifting 
her share of the cost to the others. Thus, whereas the ‘fair share’ demand curve 
for each of the neighbours ideally would be 1 ,i
QP
n n
= −  the public good demand 
curve instead becomes:
 
ai
i
QP
n n
= −
 
(36)
where ai is the reduced individual valuation for pollution reduction and can vary 
0≤ai<1. The neighbours’ aggregate demand curve is thus:
 
a
=
=
= −
∑
∑ 1
1
.
n
in
i
i
i
P Q
n
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If the factory were to accept this alternative summed demand curve from the 
neighbours, the first-order condition of its benefit maximisation would be:
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The new factory price would always be lower than optimal, 
a
= <
∑ 1 1
,
2 2
n
ii
n
 
because 
a
= <
∑ 1 1.
n
ii
n
 If so, the quantity of pollution reduction purchased by 
the neighbours would become a
2
iQ
n
=
∑
 and the factory’s return from selling 
pollution reduction to the neighbours would be 
a
p =
 
 =  ∑
2
1
.
2
n
ii
F n
 Comparing this 
result to the idealised outcome absent public goods considerations, the neighbours 
now receive less pollution reduction and the factory collects a lower return.
Importantly, however, there is absolutely no reason for the factory merely to 
accede and accommodate to the public goods price proposed from the neighbours. 
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After all, it fully controls the property right and it knows quite well that there is 
a preferable price/quantity position available. The factory thus has the incentive 
and also considerable ability to form the neighbours into a unified cartel, which 
was lacking in the reciprocal situation when the separate neighbours controlled 
the property right. Each of the neighbours individually initially would protest, 
preferring to free ride. Yet each also realises that she would be better off paying 
her fair share of the higher price, on the condition that all the other neighbours 
were compelled to do similarly. In a world of zero transaction costs, the factory by 
virtue of its discretion to refuse sale under less than the maximising payoff, is in 
a strong position to enforce that condition. If so, the social return given property 
assignment to the factory will be Pareto optimal and higher than the return given 
property assignment to the separate neighbours. Nevertheless, regardless how 
the strategic situation proceeds, the rational logic with n neighbours and one 
industrial polluter has been shown to be quite different depending upon which 
side is given the initial property right; the outcome achieved is far from invariant.
Our finding is that the claims of efficiency and invariance typically made 
by means of the Coase theorem cannot be sustained in the multiple stakeholder 
situation of anticommons, even when the restrictive assumptions of the theorem 
are preserved. Based on the logic of non-cooperative games and Nash equilibrium 
calculations, bundling in cases of fragmented ownership – despite a world of 
frictionless transactions – will occur among rational actors but at a location of 
Pareto under-utilisation. The tragedy of the anticommons does not rest merely 
upon assumption of market imperfection. 
6. Discussion
We conclude with four observations relating this analysis to various other 
discussions in the literature. First, the concept of anticommons has become a 
popular theme in law-and-society journals. Unfortunately, the concept is often 
applied imprecisely and without full understanding of the underlying strategic 
model. This is despite the fact that the model is regularly cited (e.g. Heller 2008, 
n. 61 at 209; n. 44 at 213). None of the commentators seem to have observed 
that anticommons – based on the separate maximising calculations by multiple 
actors each with exclusion rights over a necessary input – is a rational inefficiency 
that challenges Coase theorem conclusions. Michael Heller, the main advocate of 
anticommons applications to legal situations in fact has explicitly and repeatedly 
asserted that the inherent tragedy would be avoided if transactions were costless. 
“In theory”, he writes, “in a world of costless transactions, people could always 
avoid commons or anticommons tragedies by trading their rights” (Heller and 
Eisenberg 1998, 698; also Heller 1998, 673; Heller 1999, 201; Heller 2008, 46; 
Heller 2013, 24). Our assertion is that Heller is incorrect, underestimating the 
insight fundamental to the concept that he employs.
Second, we are certainly not unique in observing that an externality such as 
pollution easily can affect multiple victims, and that actors with complementary 
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property rights might engage in strategic behaviour with probable inefficient 
consequences (Cohen 1991; Epstein 1993; Hahnel and Sheeran 2009). Holdout 
can be a serious practical problem. Heller’s volume (2008) is filled with relevant 
examples, from empty Moscow storefronts to predatory copyright and patent trolls, 
to under-utilised ratio bandwidth. The opportunity for holdout adds considerably 
to the friction of self-interested bargaining, giving to any aggressive actor the 
potential for gain well above economic dessert. The anticommons model, however, 
when rigorously applied, does not depend on private information, predatory threats, 
or negotiating skill. Rather, systematic suboptimality emerges from rational Nash 
calculations by separated actors all seeking to maximise their individual return. 
The critical point is that there is no need to posit unfair strategic manipulation in 
order to generate multiple-player results at variance from the Pareto efficiency. 
Anticommons is a unique form of inherent bundling suboptimality, with sufficient 
real-world applications that it safely can be distinguished from other occurrences 
of bargaining failure.
By contrast, Aivazian and Callen begin exactly as we do, assuming perfect 
information and zero transaction costs while claiming that the Coase theorem cannot 
always be demonstrated in situations with more than two participants (Aivazian 
and Callen 1981; Aivazian et al. 1987). They posit two polluters and one victim, 
showing that the efficient grand coalition when the polluters have the property 
right rationally can be dominated by any two-player coalition, which is unstable 
against other two-player coalitions, resulting in an empty core. Coase’s response 
(1981) is that the argument depends on participants with only short-run rationality; 
if the participants play repeated iterations and can adopt a longer-run perspective, 
they will grasp that their sum returns nevertheless are stable and inferior to those 
from the grand coalition. The Aivazian-Callen approach is based on cooperative 
game theory in which the available coalitions generate different amounts of total 
value and the players seek to maximise their individual benefits by choosing among 
the possible coalition agreements. The anticommons approach instead is based on 
non-cooperative strategic choices, in which the players are seeking to maximise 
against each other. Due to the combination of Nash best responses, there exists an 
inclusive and self-enforcing equilibrium, rather than an empty core, yet it is still 
Pareto suboptimal. Grounded upon two different branches of game theory, our 
analysis and that by Aivazian can be viewed as complementary yet independent 
critical understandings of externalities and bargaining relationships.
Finally, there has been extensive controversy in the literature over the real-
world applicability of the Coase theorem once one abandons the ideal assumptions 
of perfect information, full rationality, and zero transaction costs. By the logic of 
anticommons, property rights have one-directional bias, in the sense that it is 
easier to divide and fragment a unified property than to rebundle the separated 
pieces together again. The most obvious inference is that legal systems should 
create (and often have created) a presumption on behalf of unified ownership 
and rules promoting reunification where divided property rights are outmoded or 
neglected (Parisi 2002).
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Discussion, however, has assumed an intense ideological tone when legally 
enforced rebundling is infeasible. The obvious goal is for courts to assign either 
property rights and/or liability rules in a manner is most likely to mitigate net 
harm (Calabresi and Melamed 1972; Luppi and Parisi 2011). Conservative jurist 
Richard Posner has contended that that a predisposition in favour of efficient 
markets and against public intervention is a leitmotif across Coase’s work 
(Posner 1993, 201). The legal regime thus should be structured, to the greatest 
degree plausible, “to approximate the optimum definition of property rights”, 
and then to allow unconstrained actors to “guide resource use more efficiently” 
than is possible under authoritative assignment (Posner 1977, 37). The response, 
as phrased by Paul Samuelson (1995), is that only in “Santa Claus situations” can 
the real world be structured to approximate Coase’s “polar parable”. The ensuing 
dispute is important, yet from our perspective its terms have been somewhat 
misformulated. As long as there are multiple owners of complementary rights, 
maximising against each other as well as against the actor who wishes to 
purchase a portion of that right, outcomes systematically will be inefficient. 
One need not focus only upon practical deviations from ideal conditions. One 
merely has to postulate a situation other than bi-lateral monopoly, and bi-lateral 
monopoly exists as an extreme and unlikely possibility. Coasean logic within the 
anticommons does not inherently imply any predisposition in favour of voluntary 
solutions.
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